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statutory policy of affording broad public protection to investors should be
applied [to] situations where an investor is not inactive, but participates to a
limited degree in the operation of the business."'"
The Ninth Circuit was convinced that the Turner holding did not diverge
from the Supreme Court's definition of "investment contract" in Howey." In
contrast, however, was the recent case of SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,"
which considered the Turner decision as a "different and more expansive
standard" in light of Howey and subsequent cases." Irrespective of either viewpoint, Turner attempted to adhere to the policy considerations and remedial
nature of the federal securities statutes. The Turner case avoided the establishment of a rigid and arbitrary definition for an investment contract, and chose

instead, a "flexible rather than a static principle""' in order to protect investors
through the requirement of full disclosure by issuers of securities. Since the
Supreme Court denied certiorari in Turner," there is a reason for optimism
that the courts of appeal will resurrect the spirit in which the securities acts

were legislated, and thus, apply Turner as the lawful standard for an investment
contract.5
Robert Emil Feiger

United States v. Chandler: The Requirements for Valid
Inter Vivos Gifts of United States Savings Bonds
Decedent purchased series E United States savings bonds issued in coownership form, and subsequently manually delivered these bonds to the
respective co-owners, her granddaughters, with the intention of making irrevocable inter vivos gifts to them. Decedent had furnished the entire purchase
price of the bonds, and the time of her death the Internal Revenue Service
included the bonds in her gross estate for federal estate tax purposes under
section 2040' because the bonds had not been reissued solely in the name of
each granddaughter, but rather the decedent's name remained on each bond as
co-owner. The estate paid the estate tax and brought suit for a refund in federal
district court. The court ruled that an inter vivos gift had been effected by the
decedent, and, therefore, the bonds were not includable in her gross estate."
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed per curiam for the reasons set
53SEC Securities Act Release No. 5211, Exchange Act Release No. 9387, at 3 (Nov. 30,
1971), quoting State Comm'r of Sec. v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 108
(Hawaii 1971).
" SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 483 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
42 U.S.L.W. 3194 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1973).
"3CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 3 93,960 (N.D. Ga., filed Apr. 19, 1973).
"Id. at 93,846.
"SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
5842 U.S.L.W. 3194 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1973).
"See note 52 supra.
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1954, § 2040.
v. United States, 312 F. Supp. 1263 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
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forth in the district court's opinion! The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.! Held, reversed: A co-owner of United States savings bonds cannot
effectively exclude the bonds from his gross estate at death for federal estate
tax purposes solely by making an inter vivos manual delivery of the bonds to
the other registered co-owner, but rather the bonds must be reissued to the
donee. United States v. Chandler, 410 U.S. 257 (1973).
I.

THE TRANSFER PROBLEM AND THE TREASURY REGULATIONS

The validity of a physical transfer of savings bonds from one co-owner to
the other co-owner has long been a source of conflict in state and federal
courts.5 This conflict arose primarily in the context of the federal estate tax,
with the dispute centering around the proper interpretation of the Treasury
Regulations governing United States savings bonds.! In calculating the federal estate tax, section 2040 of the Internal Revenue Code requires the entire
value of jointly owned property which carries survivorship rights to be included
in the decedent's gross estate unless the surviving co-owner can show that
he contributed a portion of the acquisition cost of the property." When the
deceased co-owner has contributed the full purchase price of the bond, the
Internal Revenue Service has invoked section 2040 even though a valid inter
vivos gift had been effected under state property laws." The Internal Revenue
Service has argued that a decedent's manual inter vivos delivery of the bonds
without reissuance is insufficient to divest him of all incidents of ownership
since the Treasury Regulations governing savings bonds require that the bonds
be submitted for reissuance solely in the name of the donee to accomplish
such a transfer of the interest.! Estates placed in this position have contended
that the Treasury Regulations do not prescribe the only manner in which a
valid inter vivos gift between co-owners can be made, but rather that a valid
inter vivos gift can also be made in accordance with state property laws."°
With approximately seventy-five percent of the 500 million series E bonds outstanding registered in co-ownership form, 1 this conflict was of significant
dimensions.
However, ownership interests in United States savings bonds are controlled
by federal law."2 Further, Congress has authorized the Secretary of the Treasury
'460 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1972).
United States v. Chandler, 410 U.S. 257 (1973).
5
4

See Comment, The Effect of Savings Bond Regulations on Inter Vivos Gifts Between
Co-owners, 4 CREIGHTON L. REV. 339 (1971); Comment, Estate Tax Consequences of Inter
Vivos Gifts Between Co-owners of United States Savings Bonds, 23 SYRACUSE L. REv. 933
(1972). See also Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 788 (1955).
6 31 C.F.R. §§ 315.0-.93 (1972). The Regulations were originally promulgated December 30, 1964, 29 Fed. Reg. 19034, codifying and amending Treasury Dept. Circular No.
350, 31 C.F.R. § 315 (1957).
'INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2040: "The value of the gross estate shall include the
value of all property to the extent of the interest therein held as joint tenants by the decedent and any other person . . . in their joint names and payable to either or the survivor . ... "
"See, e.g., Estate of Curry v. United States, 409 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1969).
9
Estate of Mae Elliott, 57 T.C. 152 (1971).
0
" Estate of Curry v. United States, 409 F.2d 671 (6th Cit. 1969); Estate of Oliver B.
Avery, 40 T.C. 392 (1963); Estate of John H. Boogher, 22 T.C. 1167 (1954).
11410 U.S. at 262 n.4.
1 Guldager v. United States, 204 F.2d 487, 489 (6th Cit. 1953).
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to issue United States savings bonds and to promulgate regulations governing
their issuance, including any restrictions on their transferability." The Supreme
Court has held that the Regulations have the force and effect of federal law,
and that, at least in the one instance of survivorship rights in savings bonds,
'
the Regulations preempt an inconsistent state property law.1
The Treasury Regulations. The Regulations" provide that the form of
"registration used on issue or reissue must express the actual ownership of and
interest in the bond and.., will be considered as conclusive of such ownership
and interest.'"" Savings bonds may be registered in single ownership form,
beneficiary form, or co-ownership form. Only one form of registration establishing co-ownership is authorized: a registration in the names of two persons
only, stated in in the alternative.' Crucial to the problem of a co-ownership so
created is the Regulations' limitation on the transfer of savings bonds. The
Regulations specify that the bonds are nontransferable and are payable only
to the registered owners.' 8 This prohibition on the transfer of savings bonds
has been further extended to judicial determinations which would result in a
transfer of bonds without reissuance, as the Regulations provide that "[n]o
judicial determination will be recognized which would give effect to an
attempted voluntary transfer inter vivos of a bond or would defeat or impair
the rights of survivorship conferred by these regulations upon a surviving coowner . . ... " The Regulations prescribe an important distinction between
requests for payment of a bond and requests for reissuance of a bond. When
the bond is registered in co-ownership form, payment during the lives of both
co-owners will be made to either upon his separate request, and upon such
payment the other co-owner ceases to have any interest in the bond." However,
a bond registered in co-ownership form will be reissued during the co-owners'
lives only upon the request of both co-owners." After the death of one coU.S.C. S 757c(a) (1970).
1"31
4

Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 668 (1962).
authorization, the Treasury has issued Regulations governing
savings bonds and has periodically revised these. The eighth revision was in effect in 1961
when the decedent delivered the bonds to her granddaughters, 31 C.F.R. 5 315 (1957).
The pertinent sections of the Regulations presently in effect remain substantially unchanged
from those in effect in 1961.
1131 C.F.R. 5 315.5 (1972).
't Id. § 315.7(a). Id. 5 315.7(a) (2) defines the co-ownership form as follows: "Coownership form-two persons (only). In the alternative as coowners. Examples: John A.
Jones 123-45-6789 or Mrs. Ella S. Jones. Mrs. Ella S. Jones or John A. Jones 123-45-9876.
No other form of registration establishing coownership is authorized."
18Id. § 315.15.
9Id. S 315.20(a). Two exceptions to this limitation on judicial determinations resulting
in the transfer of bonds are set forth in the Regulations. A court order may be entered requiring payment of bond proceeds to a judgment creditor, trustees in bankruptcy and receivers. Id. § 315.21. A judicial decree in a divorce action may be entered requiring payment or reissuance of savings bonds. Id. S 315.22.
2Id. 5 315.60.
2 Id. 5 315.61 (a). If reissuance is to be to one of the former co-owners, in addition
to requiring a request for reissuance from both co-owners, this section also requires that
the co-owner whose name is to remain on the bond be related to the co-owner whose name
is to be eliminated. The section enumerates certain acceptable relationships, one of which
is grandparent and grandchild. If the degree of relationship requirement cannot be met,
one of the following occurrences after original issuance of the bond will be sufficient: marriage of one of the co-owners, divorce or legal separation of the co-owners from each other,
or annulment of the co-owners' marriage.
1

11Pursuant to Congress'
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owner, the Regulations provide that the survivor shall be recognized as the
sole and absolute owner of the bond. Thereafter, payment or reissuance of the
bond will be carried out as if it were registered in the name of the survivor
alone, provided a request for reissuance is supported by proof of death of the
other co-owner.2 The fact that under this provision of the Regulations the
bond automatically becomes the sole property of the surviving co-owner does
not relieve the decedent's estate of possible federal estate tax liability.
II. JUDICIAL CONFLICT: INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE
TREASURY REGULATIONS

The vast majority of courts have held that attempted gifts of savings bonds
from a registered co-owner to a person not named on the bond are prohibited
by the Treasury Regulations."3 However, as to gifts of bonds between coowners, the courts were sharply divided. While the highest state courts were
not immune from the division of opinion, 4 the federal courts became the focal
point of the controversy after the Third Circuit's decision in Silverman v.
McGinnes." In Silverman, as well as the remainder of cases to be discussed in
this section, the fact situations were essentially the same as in the principal
case. Actual or constructive delivery of savings bonds between co-owners, without reissuance, was attacked as insufficient to divest the co-owner making the
gift of ownership for purposes of federal estate taxation of the bonds in his
estate. The district court in SilvermanW' included the bonds in the donor's
gross estate, concluding that the Treasury Regulations were an integral part
of the terms of the contract made with the Government by the decedent when
he bought the bonds. Therefore, pursuant to the court's interpretation of the
Regulations, the decedent's previous inter vivos manual delivery of the bonds
to the respective co-owners without reissuance was insufficient to exclude the
bonds from his estate. The Third Circuit reversed, finding a valid gift under
state property law, but the court did not rely primarily on the Regulations for
its decision."' Instead, the court viewed the transaction in terms of the creation
of a trust relationship under state property law whereby the donee became the
equitable owner and the donor became a trustee of the proceeds. With the
donee as equitable owner of the bonds and the donor having no right of
22

1d.

23See,

S 315.62.
e.g., Moore's Adm'r v. Marshall, 302 Ky. 729, 196 S.W.2d 369 (1946); Connell

v. Bauer, 240 Minn. 280, 61 N.W.2d 177 (1953); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Tezyk, 140
N.J. Eq. 474, 55 A.2d 26 (Ct. Err. & App. 1947); O'Dell v. Garrett, 82 N.M. 240, 478
P.2d 568 (1970); Hatfield v. Buck, 193 Misc. 1041, 85 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Sup. Ct. 1948);
Collins v. Jordan, 65 Ohio L. Abs. 242, 110 N.E.2d 825 (1949); Brown v. Vinson, 188
Tenn. 120, 216 S.W.2d 748 (1949).
2'See, e.g., Weeks v. Johnson, 146 Me. 371, 82 A.2d 416 (1951), a state inheritance
tax matter, wherein the court held against the taxpayer on the issue of the validity of his
inter vivos gift of savings bonds without reissuance. But see Littlejohn v. County Judge,
79 N.D. 550, 58 N.W.2d 278 (1953), in which the court determined that the Regulations
did not prohibit inter vivos gifts between co-owners without reissuance.
2'259 F.2d 731 (3d Cir. 1958).
2657-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 58,746 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
27259 F.2d 731 (3d Cir. 1958). The court stated: "The point is that with regard to
payment by the issuer, the United States Government, the provisions of the contract including
the regulations, govern. But the regulations do not apply to individual rights of persons who
under the state law of property have become equitably entitled to the proceeds." Id. at 733.
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beneficial enjoyment, the donor's state was not liable for the federal estate tax
on the value of the bonds since "[t]he Estate Tax attaches to the economic
benefit to be derived from property rather than the technical ramifications
of title.""9
A division of opinion in the circuit courts arose when the Sixth Circuit in
Estate of Curry v. United States 9 refused to follow Silverman. The court in
Curry determined the bonds to be includable in the donor's gross estate, basing
its decision on the finding that interests in series E bonds are "created by federal contract and controlled by federal law,""0 and a further determination that
"[tihe Treasury Regulations ...provide that the bonds cannot be transferred
but can be surrendered and reissued." 1 However, the court failed to elaborate
further on its interpretation and analysis of the Regulations. Moreover, the
cases primarily relied on by the Sixth Circuit did not involve transfers between
co-owners, but rather transfers from a co-owner to a person not registered
on the bond."'
In three early decisions,"3 the Tax Court appeared to take a position similar
to that taken by the Third Circuit in Silverman. In none of these cases did the
Tax Court find that it was barred by the Treasury Regulations from considering
whether a valid gift of savings bonds could be made from one co-owner to
the other co-owner. However, in all three cases, the Tax Court included the
bonds in the donor's gross estate, basing the inclusion on the absence of all
the requirements necessary to establish a valid gift."
2 the Tax Court changed its posiIn a 1971 decision, Estate of Mae Elliott,"
tion and adopted that of the Sixth Circuit as stated in Curry. The Tax Court
in Elliott thoroughly analyzed the Treasury Regulations and concluded that
surrender and reissuance represented the only manner in which to effectuate a
gift of savings bonds between co-owners, and, therefore, the bonds remained
in the donor's gross estate despite a previous inter vivos constructive delivery.
The court based its decision upon a presumption in the Regulations that the
bond registration conclusively reflects actual ownership, " and upon the gen28
1Id. at

734.

29409 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1969).

80Id. at 673. This position was previously set forth by the Sixth Circuit in its decision
of Guldager v. United States, 204 F.2d at 489.
81
409 F.2d at 673.
22
1d. at 673-74.
"2Estate of Jack F. Chrysler, 44 T.C. 55 (1965); Estate of Oliver B. Avery, 40 T.C. 392
(1963); Estate of John H. Boogher, 22 T.C. 1167 (1954). The Tax Court's decision in
Estate of Jack F. Chrysler was reversed on appeal by the Second Circuit. 361 F.2d 508 (2d
Cir. 1966). The Second Circuit determined that the decedent's interest in the bonds was
purely nominal because he had utilized the co-ownership arrangement in making gifts to his
minor children solely to avoid creating formal trusts which otherwise would have been necessary for this purpose prior to the New York custodianship statute. Since the decedent had
effectively divested himself of all beneficial interests in the property, including savings bonds,
the property was not includable in his gross estate. Id.
34In Estate of Oliver B. Avery and Estate of John H. Boogher, the Tax Court based
its finding of an invalid gift on the fact that the evidence presented was insufficient to establish that the decedent intended to or did release his interest as potential survivor. 40 T.C. at
402; 22 T.C. at 1172. Important in deciding Estate of Oliver B. Avery and Estate of Jack
P. Chrysler was the fact that following the purported gift, the savings bonds were kept in
a safe deposit box to which the donor had the right of access. 40 T.C. at 402; 44 T.C. at 65.
3557 T.C. 152 (1971). The Fifth Circuit affirmed on appeal after the Supreme Court's
decision in Chandler. 474 F.2d 1008 (5th Cit. 1973).
2657 T.C. at 160; see 31 C.F.R. S 315.5 (1972).
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eral proscription against transferability in the Regulations."7 From these sections
and the payment and reissue provisions of the Regulations,"8 the court reasoned
that, since the donor-decedent's name remained on the bonds, "it is indisputable
that at any time up until the moment prior to the decedent's death, the decedent, if she had presented the series E bonds in question to the United States,
would have received the redemption value of the bonds.""9 The court further
deemed it desirable to "promote certainty, predictability, and uniformity,""0 in
the results reached among the various jurisdictions as to the problem of savings
bond transfers between co-owners.
III.

UNITED STATES V. CHANDLER

Relying on the Treasury Regulations as to the conclusiveness of the registration as reflecting actual ownership,"1 the general proscription of transfers of
savings bonds,"0 the prohibition of courts from recognizing transfers,' the
payment and reissuance requirements," and the recognition of the surviving
co-owner as sole and absolute owner,' the Supreme Court of the United States
in United States v. Chandler concluded that "[tihe regulations thus made the
jointly issued bond nontransferable in itself and permitted a change in ownership, so long as both co-owners were alive, only through reissuance at the
request of both co-owners."" The Court considered the scope and applicability
of the Regulations to the specific problem of gifts between co-owners, and its
summary disposition of this issue would seem to be warranted. 7 In previous
decisions questioning the scope and applicability of the Regulations, it had
been argued that the Regulations govern only the rights between a bondholder
and the Government and do not govern the rights of co-owners as between
themselves." This argument overlooks the fact that, while the Government
has no further liability or concern once it has paid the bond proceeds to a registered co-owner, as to the outstanding bond itself, the owner or owners take the
bond subject to the terms of the Treasury Regulations and on the reverse side
of a savings bond it is stated that the bond is subject to the provisions of the
Regulations. Therefore, whenever the bond is being dealt with, whether as to
3757 T.C. at 160; see 31 C.F.R. § 315.15

(1972).
"'31 C.F.R. §§ 315.60, 315.61(a) (1972).
57 T.C. at 160-61.
40Id. at 161.
4131 C.F.R. § 315.5 (1972).
4
.Id.
5 315.15.
41Id.
5 315.20(a).
-Id. 5§ 315.60, 315.61 (a). In the Regulations as in effect at the time of the decedent's
purported gift, and, therefore, the revision cited by the Supreme Court, the payment and reissuance provisions were combined into one section in S 315.60. The present revision is
substantially the same as to substance with only the numbering of sections changed slightly.
45Id.
§ 315.62. In the eighth revision, this provision appeared in S 315.61.
461410 U.S. at 260.
" The Court stated: "We have no reason to rule against the integrity and effect of the
regulations. . . . No claim is made-and none could be made-that the regulations are
unclear or are inapplicable . . . . Nor can we view the regulations as an undue or improper
restriction of the transfer rights the decedent would otherwise have. The bonds were issued
subject to transfer restrictions, and those restrictions, in the eyes of the law at least, were
known to her." Id. at 261.
48See, e.g., Silverman v. McGinnes, 259 F.2d 731 (3d Cir. 1958); In re Hendricksen's
Estate, 156 Neb. 463, 56 N.W.2d 711 (1953).
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attempted transfers between co-owners or presentations of the bond for payment or reissuance, the Treasury Regulations must be considered as regulating
and controlling the transaction.
As the basic reason for its interpretation of the Regulations, the Court
relied on the fact that the Regulations themselves provide for the retention of
certain rights by any donor whose name remains on a bond. The Court noted
that the decisions below overlooked "the facts that until her death, the decedent retained the right to redeem each of the bonds in question, the right to
succeed to the proceeds if she survived the putative donee, and the right to
join or to veto any attempt to have the bonds reissued."' Despite the donor's
manual delivery of the bonds, her name remained on the bonds as a co-owner,
and the Regulations provide that the registration is considered as conclusive
of the actual ownership of and interest in a bond."5 Notwithstanding her present donative intent at the time of the attempted gift, had the donor at a later
time regained possession of the bonds, she, acting alone, could have presented
the bonds for payment and received the proceeds since the Regulations permit
payment to either registered co-owner upon his separate request.'
Whether an irrevocable divestiture of all incidents of ownership was accomplished by the donor is at least questionable in light of the above payment
provisions, but the survivorship provisions of the Regulations clearly dictate a
finding of the non-existence of a valid gift. The Regulations recognize the
surviving co-owner as "the sole and absolute owner" and, thereafter, permit
payment or reissuance "as though the bond were registered in the name of the
survivor alone ....""
In Chandler,if one or both of the respective donees had
predeceased the donor, then that donee's bonds would automatically have reverted to the donor because the donor's name remained on the bonds and the
Regulations would, therefore, recognize her as the surviving co-owner. Any
attempt by a court to prevent this automatic reversion of the bonds to the
surviving donor would be violative of the Regulations' specific prohibition of
any judicial determination defeating or impairing the rights of survivorship
conferred by the Regulations.53 The district court's statement in Chandler, that
it was fully recognizing the surviving co-owner's rights, 4 was valid under the
specific facts presented with the donor predeceasing the donees. However, the
Supreme Court realized that no inter vivos gift can be considered effective
which depends for its validity on a specific order of death of the parties to
the gift.
The Supreme Court's point concerning reissuance involves the requirement
of the Regulations that reissuance must be at the request of both registered
co-owners. Had either donee later decided to have her respective bonds reissued solely to herself or to herself and another person, the donor could have
at that time refused to join in the reissuance. Thus, no reissuance would have
" 410 U.S. at 261.
5031 C.F.R. § 315.5 (1972).
51
1d. S 315.60.

5id. S 315.62.

111d.

§ 315.20(a).
312 F. Supp. at 1268.
"31 C.F.R. § 315.61(a)

(1972).
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been possible since the donor retained her status as a registered co-owner as
her name remained on the bonds. With absolute control over reissuance retained by the donor, it is difficult to view the transaction as effectively divesting
the donor of all incidents of ownership.
The Supreme Court was correct in its statement that the lower courts overlooked these rights retained by the donor to receive the proceeds, to succeed
to the sole ownership of the bonds, and to join or defeat any reissuance attempt.
As the primary basis for its decision, the district court, with the approval of
the Ninth Circuit, had interpreted the Treasury Regulations' proscription that
"[slavings bonds are not transferable and are payable only to the owners
named thereon.. ."" as only prohibiting transfers between a co-owner and a
person not registered on the bond, and not as prohibiting transfers without reissuance between co-owners/ In light of this interpretation, the lower courts
reasoned that the decision to exclude the bonds from the donor's estate was
not in violation of the Regulations' prohibition of judicial determinations
resulting in inter vivos transfers of savings bonds without reissuance 8 However,
in view of the rights retained by the donor which were noted by the Supreme
Court, the lower courts' interpretation of the Regulations as not prohibiting
transfers between co-owners is difficult to reconcile with the recognized rights
of the donor because the Regulations would then be validating manual transfers between co-owners, and at the same time permitting the transferring coowner to retain basic incidents of ownership.
The Supreme Court's determination that these three rights were retained by
the donor was a sufficient basis for the decision to include the bonds in the
donor's estate, notwithstanding the Third Circuit's view in Silverman that
"[t~he Estate Tax attaches to the economic benefit to be derived from property
rather than the technical ramifications of title." 9 These rights retained by the
donor cannot, it seems, be considered as mere "technical ramifications of title."
Rather, these rights are the essence of the "economic benefit" to be derived
from the savings bonds, and their retention required federal estate taxation of
the bonds as part of the decedent's estate. The Regulations' prohibition of
judicial determinations resulting in transferse' provides further support for
the result reached, although the Court merely noted this section generally,
along with all of the other pertinent sections of the Regulations, and stated a
general conclusion as to nontransferability.l
The Court's interpretation of the Regulations as requiring reissuance in gifts
between co-owners is fully consistent with the purpose of the Treasury Regulations. The Regulations have been described as designed for the convenience
and protection of the Government in exercising its power to borrow money
and for the purpose of facilitating the handling of matters involving bonds
5

61d. § 315.15.
"7312 F. Supp. at 1268.
S8Id. 31 C.F.R. 5 315.20(a) (1972) provides: "No judicial determination will be recognized which would give effect to an attempted voluntary transfer inter vivos of a bond or
would defeat or impair the rights of survivorship conferred by these regulations upon a
surviving coowner . ... "
-1259 F.2d at 734.
6031 C.F.R. § 315.20(a) (1972).
" See note 19 supra.
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and bondholders." They also are to make the bonds attractive to savers and
investors 3 and to protect the bondholders' interests." While not specifically
stating that it was considering the purpose of the Regulations, the Court
expressed its belief that any other rule besides the one announced would result in chaotic conditions. Something less than absolute freedom of transfer
of savings bonds seemed justified when the Court considered the requirements
of Government for uniformity and for proper recordkeeping, as well as to
considerations of safety and an aspect of permanency in the investment."
Presently, all that is required for a registered co-owner to receive the proceeds
of his bond is presentation of the bond for payment to the Treasury or one of
its authorized agents and production by the bondholder of proper identification.
If reissuance was not required in gifts between co-owners, then the provision
in the Regulations that the registration is conclusive of actual ownership would
be defeated since a co-owner who had given his interest in the bond to the
other co-owner without reissuance would still appear to be a registered coowner from the face of the bond. With the registration no longer reflecting
actual ownership, the handling of redemptions would be a complex matter
for the Treasury and bondholders, making necessary the submission of some
form of proof of ownership, besides the registration, to assure payment being
received only by the actual owner. Further, with the fairly competitive rate
of interest now paid by the Government on savings bonds,"6 any additional
handling costs imposed on the Treasury could very well destroy the effectiveness of savings bonds as a device for borrowing money.
One important purpose of the Treasury Regulations which previous decisions, including the district court's decision in Chandler,had noted but to which
the Supreme Court in Chandler failed to refer specifically, is that of the prevention of suits against the Government by adverse claimants to savings
bonds." However, whether manual delivery or reissuance had been deemed
the proper method of effectuating a gift, it is difficult to envision the Government becoming involved in litigation between claimants to bonds since once
the Government pays the proceeds of a properly presented bond to a registered
co-owner, regardless of whether he is the actual owner, the Government's
liability is fully terminated. The Government is further insulated from litigation under either alternative by the provision in the Regulations that
"[n]either the Treasury Department nor any agency for the issue, reissue, or
redemption of savings bonds will accept notices of adverse claims or of pending judicial proceedings .... ."8 Nevertheless, with a rule which does not
require reissuance in gifts between co-owners, registered co-owners receiving
"2Byer v. Byer, 180 Kan. 258, 303 P.2d 137 (1956).
63 Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 669 (1962).
4Estate of Mae Elliott, 57 T.C. 152, 156 (1971).
"' 410 U.S. at 261-62.
6 The current rate of interest paid on Series E United States Savings Bonds is 51%
if held
to maturity. 31 U.S.C. § 757c(b) (1) (1970); 31 C.F.R. § 31 6 .2(e) (1972).
67
See, e.g., Silverman v. McGinnes, 259 F.2d 731, 733-34 (3d Cir. 1958); District of
Columbia v. Wilson, 216 F.2d 630, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Estate of Mae Elliott, 57 T.C.
152, 156 (1971). See also Chandler v. United States, 312 F. Supp. 1263, 1268 (N.D. Cal.
1970).
6831 C.F.R. 5 315.20(b) (1972).
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the proceeds of bonds would again not necessarily be the actual owners if a
transfer between co-owners had occurred, and any rule which permitted the
Government to pay proceeds to persons who were not actual owners and then
disclaim any further liability or responsibility could certainly lead to nothing
but what the Court referred to as chaotic conditions.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in Chandlerclearly resolved the conflict over
the proper procedure to be followed in gifts of savings bonds between coowners. The bondholder need no longer speculate as to the validity of his gift
under the Treasury Regulations or state property law. The determination that
reissuance represents the only manner in which to effectuate a gift of bonds
between co-owners was the only practical and realistic conclusion that the
Court could have reached considering the basic incidents of ownership retained
by the donor in a transfer without reissuance. The Court's decision recognized the fact that under the Treasury Regulations the donor simply cannot
be considered as having divested himself of all incidents of ownership by the
gift while his name remains on the bond as a registered co-owner. The decision
further achieved uniformity among the jurisdictions in that the diverse property
laws of the various states need no longer be considered in gifts of savings
bonds between co-owners.
With the Court's specific holding that gifts between co-owners may only be
effectuated by reissuance of the bonds, the general conclusion now appears to
be warranted that no transfer of savings bonds is ever permissible except when
the transfer is accomplished through reissuance. Savings bonds presently have
engraved on their face in large capital letters "Not Transferable," and on the
reverse side, among other terms and conditions as well as instructions for payment, it is again stated that the bond is "not transferable," with no explana
tion as to the possibility of reissuance being provided. Upon consideration of
the Chandler decision it would appear to be appropriate to provide notice of
the reissuance requirement on the bond itself by expanding the "not transferable" phrase on the reverse side into a more informative statement providing
that no transfer is permissible without surrender of the bond and its subsequent reissuance.
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